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LOOKING AT MARRIAGE 
Naomi Cahn* 
ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE. By 
Milton C. Regan, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. 
x, 279. $45. 
In a recent book (not the subject of this Review), highly successful 
and popular authors John Gottman and Nan Silver set out their seven 
effective principles for making a marriage last. The final suggestion is 
that spouses should "create shared meaning, an inner life together that 
is rich with symbols and family rituals and that honors the hopes of 
both partners."1 In a happy marriage, the couples not only provide 
support for each other, but also "build a sense of purpose into their 
lives together."2 Professor Gottman has developed these principles as 
a result of twenty years of research and observation of happily and 
unhappily married couples. Based on the interaction between couples 
in his Love Lab, he can predict, with over 90% accuracy, which cou­
ples will stay together and which will divorce.3 
In Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of Marriage, Professor 
Milton Regan4 also examines the state of contemporary American 
marriage, and he too argues for recognizing the importance of shared 
meaning between the partners (p. 5), and commitment to the marriage 
as an entity rather than simply to the individual lives of the spouses. 
He bases his prescription for the institution of marriage on an exami-
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. - Ed. The author 
thanks Katharine Baker, Adam Becker, Brian Bix, June Carbone, Jane Murphy, Trisha 
Smith, Michelle Wu, and George Washington University Law School. 
1. JOHN GOITMAN & NAN SILVER, SEVEN PRINCIPLES FOR MAKING A MARRIAGE 
WORK 23 {1999). The other six principles are: 1) know the intimate details of your spouse's 
world; 2) foster your fondness and respect of each other; 3) look to your spouse rather than 
away; 4) allow your spouse to affect and influence you; 5) resolve the problems that you can; 
and 6) move away from gridlock to discussion. See id. 
In her recent book based on a study of 160 men and women in intimate relationships in 
three countries, researcher Sally Cline found that the following issues determined the success 
of a married couple: "Commitment, Co=unication, Coping with Change, Cherishing, and 
Compromise . . . and Interdependence: the balance between dependence and independ­
ence." SALLY CLINE, COUPLES: SCENES FROM TiiE INSIDE 15 {1999). 
2. GOTrMAN & SILVER, supra note 1, at 23. 
3. See Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, The Science of a Good Marriage, 
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 1999, at 54; Philip Weiss, Is this Marriage on the Rocks, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2000, at 61. 
4. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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nation of three different issues: first, the accuracy of the law and eco­
nomics approach to marriage; second, the continuing validity of the 
spousal evidentiary privileges; and third, the division of property be­
tween spouses upon divorce. Like Gottman and Silver, Regan is con­
cerned about contemporary marriage. Unlike Gottman and Silver, 
however, Regan_ focuses on the cultural institution and societal mean­
ings of marriage rather than on the meaning of marriage to any par­
ticular couple. 
Professor Regan is an extremely thoughtful scholar of the family 
and of marriage. In a previous book, he argued for a reinvigoration of 
status-based responsibilities in family law in order to foster greater 
intimacy between family members.5 Alone Together continues the ar­
gument, placing it in the context of political conversations about the 
relationship between self and community. 
Marriage clearly requires the individual spouses to balance their 
own identities with their identity as a couple,6 and it thus simultane­
ously implicates issues of interconnection and individual fairness. 
Alone Together identifies two different stances in marriage that impli­
cate both individual spouse and marital entity: an external stance, 
which is identified with the individual's benefit, and an internal stance, 
which is identified with the community. By clearly articulating these 
tensions within marriage, Regan offers an extremely useful perspective 
on marriage. Indeed, the strength of this book is in its persuasive de­
scriptions of the critical nature of both care and justice within mar­
riage, and the difficulty of balancing them. 
The question that remains after reading this extremely thought­
provoking book is: why marriage?7 If anyone can defend the institu­
tion, then this select company includes Regan.8 There have been many 
other defenders of marriage as an institution who argue, from a con­
ser\rative slant, that it will lift wome.n out of poverty, provide fathers 
for children, reweave the moral fabric of America, and, in general, 
save our society.9 Regan, being far more measured and thoughtful, 
5. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993) 
[hereinafter REGAN, FAMILY LAW]. For a sympathetic and perceptive review, see Margaret 
Brinig, Status, Contract, and Covenant, 19 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (1994) (book review). 
6. See Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The Ethics of Marital 
Representation, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (1998). 
7. This question should not be confused with another, recently posed and answered by 
E.J. Graff. See EJ. GRAFF, WHAT ISMARRIAGE FOR? (1999). . . 
8. Of course, there have been other persuasive defenders as well, including Yale Law 
School Professor William Eskridge. See WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME­
SEX MARRIAGE (1996). 
9. See, e.g., Institute for American Values, Press Release, Sept. 22, 1999, at 1 (visited 
Feb. 16, 2000) <llttp://www.americanvalues.org/Unwedmothers.htm> (reviewing MAGGIE 
GALLAGHER, THE AGE OF UNWED MOTHERS: IS TEEN PREGNANCY THE PROBLEM? 
(1999)) ("For Gallagher, the key to understanding the teen pregnancy crisis is mar­
riage . . . .  "). 
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eloquently defends marriage on behalf of married people rather than 
as the solution to all of society's alleged ills. 
In this Review, I will first discuss Professor Regan's observations 
on marriage. In the second Part, I will question the utility of marriage 
itself: why not allow adults to choose their own means of commitment 
to each other and/or to others? Regardless of what is happening to the 
state of contemporary marriage, adults are committed to the family as 
a functional institution, rather than to particular rigid forms. 
Next, I will question the applicability of Regan's conclusions to 
women, poor people, and nonwhite people. For example, in Regan's 
critique of the economic approach to marriage, he does not mention 
the special problems of poor people for whom a law and economics 
approach provides little explanatory power. Indeed, there are a series 
of special issues concerning marriage that these groups confront. 
The two different stances on marriage that Regan articulates are 
critical to an understanding and appreciation of marriage and its role 
in society. Regan has made an accurate diagnosis that both stances 
reflect important moments in marriage, but that there may be some 
unavoidable tensions between them. In his analysis of the law and 
economics approach, spousal privilege, and divorce financial awards, 
he suggests that an external stance neglects important aspects that are 
indeed captured through the internal stance. Accordingly, perhaps 
our culture should focus more on the marital relationship than on the 
rights of each individual spouse. But I believe it is necessary to look 
deeper. Within each marriage, gendered expectations affect which 
spouse is relationally-focused and which spouse is fairness-focused, 
and thus the individuals within each relationship should acknowledge 
the insights of both stances and seek a more equitable "internal" bal­
ance. 
I. THEBOOK 
Before turning to the book, I want to discuss briefly the state of 
contemporary American marriage. Marriage has become, indeed, has 
always been, a crucible for examining and solving all of society's 
problems. The movement toward covenant marriage in Louisiana and 
many other states is symbolic of a perceived decline in commitment to 
marriage continuity, and of attempts to preserve the besieged institu­
tion of marriage.10 There is also much hand-wringing over the per­
ceived decline in commitment to marriage itself, given the number of 
10. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 9:272-75 (West Supp. 2000); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 25-901 to 906 (West Supp. 1999); Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault­
Based Divorce Reform Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. 
L. REV. 611, 619-20 (1999); Gary H. Nichols, Note, Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee 
Join the Nobel Experiment?, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 397 (1999). 
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cohabitating couples. Many scholars have suggested that the increase 
in the divorce rate over the past three decades indicates that the public 
views contemporary marriage as nothing more than a contract for self­
fulfillment.11 As a result of an increasing societal emphasis on per­
sonal psychological happiness, they believe that the focus in marriage 
is no longer on others, but on the individual's own self-fulfillment.12 
The new ideology of families celebrates, in the words of one critic, the 
"Love Family,"13 which is based on choice and voluntary affiliation 
with another adult rather than on the commitment traditionally asso­
ciated with marriage. Instead of living within an ethic that celebrates 
relationships and obligations to others, the new ethic celebrates obli­
gations only to oneself. Vulnerability and dependence (and marriage 
itself) are useful, according to this critique, only when they further in­
dividual happiness. For example, while many parents used to believe 
it was important to stay together for the children, this is no longer 
true.14 One recent report summarized these contemporary concerns 
about marriage: 
The popular culture strongly reinforces th[ e] sense of pessimism, even 
doom about the chances for marital success . . . .  
Marriage is losing much of its status and authority as a social institu­
tion . . . .  
For most Americans, marriage is a 'couples relationship' desired primar­
ily to meet the sexual and emotional needs of the spouses . . . . People 
tend to be puzzled or put off by the idea that marriage has purposes or 
11. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, for example, blames the high divorce rate on individuals' 
desire for self-fulfillment at the expense of commitment and nurturing. See BARBARA 
WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 4, 6 (1997); see also Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, 
Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503; see 
generally Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225 
(1997) (book review). 
12 See Whitehead, supra note 11, at 54. Professor Regan has pointed out "doubt that 
there is any genuine consensus about what marriage is and what its moral obligations ought 
to be." Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 
UTAH L. REV. 605, 608 [hereinafter Regan, Market Discourse]. There is even doubt that 
marriage should connote a special status. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED 
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). 
Regardless of the future of marriage, it does carry with it certain privileges and images; this 
Article is based on the existing institution of marriage. 
13. Whitehead, supra note 11, at 144, 152. 
14. Whitehead cites a study that asked women in 1962 whether they believed that par­
ents who did not get along with each other should stay together for the children. Fifty-one 
percent did not believe this was appropriate. By 1977, 80% did not think this was appropri­
ate. See id. at 82. Studies of why people divorce affirm Whitehead's conclusions with respect 
to the changing reasons for divorce. According to several studies, failure of communication 
or feeling unloved are the most frequent reasons given for divorce. See CATHERINE 
KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK (1990); Lynn Gigy & Joan B. Kelly, Reason for Di­
vorce: Perspectives of Divorcing Men and Women, 18 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 169, 186 
(1992). Historically, there has also been a shift in the reasons for divorce. See generally 
GRAFF, supra note 7. 
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benefits that extend beyond fulfilling individual adult needs for intimacy 
and satisfaction.15 
Within the law, the shift toward individual fulfillment and away 
from state control is seen in the concern over privatization. The ar­
gument is that there has been a shift from state intervention and state­
imposed norms toward more private decisionmaking.16 Professor Jana 
Singer carefully points out the many areas in which private contracting 
has replaced more public ordering, ranging from premarital contract­
ing to adoption.17 In addition, she suggests that the distinction be­
tween marital status and nonmarital status is diminishing.18 
Notwithstanding all of this hand-wringing about the declining im­
portance of marriage, the marriage rate today is comparable to the 
marriage rate in the late nineteenth century.19 While the marriage rate 
peaked for those born during the 1920s and 1930s, and has been de­
clining since, the institution of marriage is not disappearing.20 Even 
when people leave first marriages, they overwhelmingly return to the 
institution by remarrying. Indeed, as an example of the appeal of mar-
15. DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WIDTEHEAD, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: 
THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 4-6 (1999). 
16. See Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 25 (1996). 
17. See Jana Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443. Others, 
with varying levels of approval, have also documented the increasing privatization of family 
law and the corresponding power of individuals to enter into contracts with respect to issues 
that were formerly a matter solely of domestic relations law. See, e.g., p. 5; Marjorie Maguire 
Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 
204 (1982). For other perspectives, see MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 
(1989); Janet Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 
GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994). 
18. See Singer, supra note 17, at 1447-56. 
19. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE (Rev. ed. 1992); 
HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF, THE AGE OF THE BACHELOR: CREATING AN AMERICAN 
SUBCULTURE (1999); Peter Brimelow, Too Many Bachelors?, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1999, at 143 
(reporting that 31 % of contemporary American men have never been married, but 44 % had 
never married a century ago, and the percentage of contemporary married women is the 
same as a century ago). 
20. See CHERLIN, supra note 19, at 10-11. Cherlin explains: 
More than 90 percent of the women in every birth cohort on record (records extend back to 
the mid-1800s) have eventually married. The adults who came of age after World War II 
have the highest lifetime percentage married . . . .  [R]ecent estimates suggest that the lifetime 
percentage married among women born during the baby boom may fall below the historical 
minimum of 90 percent by a percentage point or two. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
The percentage of men and women over age 35 who have never married is lower today 
than it was in 1950. See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. B!ANCI-Il, BALANCING ACT: 
MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 27, tbl. 2.2 
(1996). Spain and Bianchi also note that the median age at first marriage is increasing and 
that women who marry at an older age are less likely to divorce {although more likely to 
have nonmarital children). See id. at 26. 
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riage, consider the efforts of gay activists to make marriage available 
to same-sex partners.21 Broadening access to marriage is an attempt to 
reinforce the importance of marriage, rather than an attempt to un­
dermine it.22 
Marriage has always served state interests, regardless of the indi­
vidual economic and social interests of spouses. Underlying its lan­
guage of companionship, marriage is a public status that historically 
has been regulated publicly to serve the purposes of the state.23 It is, 
then, simultaneously an intensely private relationship and an ex­
tremely public status that has been manipulated to support prevailing 
public images of morality and social order. For example, Professor 
Nancy Cott shows how the federal government manipulated notions of 
citizenship during the nineteenth century based on a woman's marital 
status in order to form and reinforce appropriate gender roles.24 Thus, 
in 1855, Congress enacted a statute providing that a woman who mar­
ried a male citizen of the United States herself became a citizen, with­
out making any provision for marriage to a female citizen; Cott argues 
that this "underline[ s] customary male headship of the marital couple 
as a civic and political norm."25 Judges in the nineteenth century re­
fused to allow spouses to divorce each other except upon a finding of 
fault; even when judges were granted enormous discretion to allow a 
divorce based on incompatibility, they forced marriages to continue 
because of the public interest in the marital status and because of ex­
treme antipathy to allowing parties to determine the terms of their 
marriage contracts.26 Moreover, marriage used to control sexuality 
and the legitimacy of children.27 
21. There is extensive literature on this. See generally, e.g., EsKRIDGE, supra note 8. 
22. Some gay activists have argued that allowing same-sex marriage will, in fact, under­
mine the institution. That is not, however, the primary argument offered by most same-sex 
marriage advocates who seek access to marriage because they respect the existing institution 
and its privileges. See id.; see also Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist 
Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: 
Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gen­
der in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This Day 
Forward: A Feminb:ze Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE LJ. 1783 (1988). 
23. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics, and the 
Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860-1920, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 541 (1998). 
24. See Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States, 1830-
1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1442 (1998). 
25. Id. at 1456 (emphasis in original). 
26. See Naomi Cahn, Finding Fault, Presentation at American Society for Legal History 
Annual Meeting (October 1999); see also HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 
63-92 (forthcoming 2000). 
27. See Lindsay, supra note 23, at 547. 
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Judges and legislatures have used marriage as a means to privatize 
dependence, to foster women's dependence on men.28 By finding a 
marriage when evidence was doubtful as to its existence, judges have 
made men, not the state, responsible for women's financial needs. In 
cases where women sought to establish a common law marriage, a 
finding in their favor served simultaneously to privatize and moralize 
their relationships.29 Thus, marriage has always involved public and 
private interests - and, of course, public regulation is intimately inter­
twined with those private interests that are protected by, and in, mar­
riage.30 
Professor Regan begins the book by examining the different pri­
vate interests that are at the "heart" of marriage. The central concept 
of Alone Together is the distinction between two different approaches 
to marriage that exist simultaneously within any marriage: "an 'exter­
nal' stance [which] represents an individual's capacity to reflect criti­
cally upon, rather than simply identify with her commitments and at­
tachments ... [and an] 'internal' stance [in which] marriage appears as 
a universe of shared meaning that serves as the taken-for-granted 
background for individual conduct" (p. 5). The external stance allows 
individuals to evaluate for themselves the costs and benefits of any 
particular relationship, and to assess, independently, whether their 
self-interest is advanced (pp. 17-18). It is characterized by concepts 
such as consent, justice, equality, and contract (p. 24). 
By contrast, the internal stance focuses on the individual as em­
bedded in connection with others. It is concerned with sustaining rela­
tionships; it "tends to blur the boundary between self and other" (p. 
25), and it requires trust (pp. 24-25). Unlike the external stance, 
where obligations to the other spouse develop as a result of contract or 
consent, obligations to the other spouse that are based on the internal 
stance develop as a result of the relationship itself (p. 26). The identity 
of each spouse does not exist independently of the other, but is, at 
least partially, defined by the existence of the marriage (p. 25). While 
the external stance is associated with traditional liberalism and with an 
ethic of justice, the internal stance "has some affinities with both the 
communitarian critique of liberalism and with emphasis on an ethic of 
care."31 Regan argues that both perspectives are critical to a marriage 
but that the stances are "irreducible to one another" (p. 29). 
28. See generally Lindsay, supra note 23; Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through 
Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885 (1997). 
29. See generally Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common 
Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 718 (1996). 
30. See generally Lindsay, supra note 23; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State lnterven· 
tion in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History 
and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV.1135, 1174-79. 
31. P. 27. The ethics of justice and care are associated with the work of Carol Gilligan. 
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) [hereinafter GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT 
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In a wonderful passage in the book, Regan uses a scene from Amy 
Tan's novel, The Joy Luck Club, to dramatize the awkwardness of 
autonomy without community in marriage.32 The mother of Lena, the 
main character, notices the careful accounting of expenses between 
her daughter and son-in-law with a bottom line that her daughter will 
owe money to her son-in-law; Lena explains that she and her husband 
want to " 'eliminate false dependencies ... be equals ... love without 
obligation' " (p. 23). As Regan observes, this couple is missing the 
richness and interdependence of relationship that is inherent in our 
cultural concept of marriage. "Genuine intimacy, however, seems to 
demand that she also be able to take an internal stance from which the 
relationship is taken as a given without references to the individual 
costs and benefits."33 Ultimately, these two different stances express 
tensions in our culture outside of marriage, explains Regan. His ex­
ploration of marriage serves as merely one example, albeit an impor­
tant one, of tensions between the individual and the community, ten­
sions that are central to liberal and communitarian thought (p. 30). 
Having established the two distinct stances, Regan applies them in 
three different marriage-related contexts to show the necessity of bal­
ance rather than complete reliance on one stance or the other. First, 
Regan examines the economic, or market approach to marriage, 
looking at the rhetoric of the law and economics perspective. He re­
turns to the economic approach to marriage in the third part of the 
book, when he examines property distribution upon divorce. Second, 
Regan examines the two different forms of privileges for spouses 
called to testify against each other. Although Regan observes that his 
articulation of the tensions between the two stances does not resolve 
all of the dilemmas of modem marriage (p. 205), he does indicate his 
preference for resolving these dilemmas: he believes that it is impor­
tant for society to shift toward more of an internal stance. 
In Part II, Markets and Marriage, and Part IV, Money and Divorce, 
Regan examines the impact of market-based discourses on the family. 
VOICE]; Carol Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self in Relationships 
in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION 3 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter 
Gilligan, Remapping]. She has suggested that the ethic of care correlates with the way that 
many women approach the world because it focuses on relationships between people. See id. 
at 7. An ethic of justice focuses on legal, abstract, and hierarchical rights. See id. at 8. See 
also generally Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1039 (1992); Naomi R. 
Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1991); Carrie Menkel­
Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. 
POL'Y & L. 75 (1994). 
32. AMY TAN, THE JOY LUCK CLUB 160-65 (1989). 
33. P. 24. Further support of Regan's perspective occurs shortly after Lena's explana­
tion to her mother, when Lena confronts her husband: "Why do you have to be so goddamn 
fair! . . .  We need to think about what our marriage is really based on . . .  not this balance 
sheet, who owes who what." TAN, supra note 32, at 164-65. 
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Although Part II focuses on the rhetoric of law and economics, and 
Part IV focuses on the rhetoric and reality of a property-based per­
spective, both parts of the book are concerned with the implications of 
the external stance involving the economics of marriage and the con­
cepts of spouses as independent, contracting actors. 
A. Money, Contracts, and Economics 
Regan begins his application of the internal and external stances to 
contemporary family law issues by describing the law and economics 
approach to the family. He explores the increasingly widespread use 
of this discourse to describe contemporary family life, and then cri­
tiques the approach. 
The most prominent proponents of this approach - e.g., Gary 
Becker and Richard Posner - argue that spouses participate in a mar­
riage market; if the overall utility of becoming married outweighs the 
overall utility of remaining single, then individuals will get married (p. 
35). They argue, first, that labor specialization, in which one family 
member works primarily in the market sector, and the other in the 
household sector, maximizes utility.34 Second, they argue that intrinsic 
differences between men and women dictate that women are more 
biologically suited to staying home and raising the children while men, 
of course, are better suited to market production.35 Women inevitably 
have different preferences for market jobs.36 Women specialize in 
building the human capital of their children and husbands, while men 
specialize in market capital.37 Traditional gender roles, in which the 
woman stays home while the man is the breadwinner, provide the 
most efficient mechanism for family resource allocation; and this is the 
way of measuring marital success because "happiness or utility or wel­
fare [are] synonyms." 38 In sum, marriage is seen "as a rational joint 
venture that involves bargaining over and implicit exchange of re­
sources. " 39 
34. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14-21 (1981). 
35. See id. at 21-22. The sociobiologists agree with this second point. Judge Posner 
points out two causes for women staying home: first, sex discrimination in the labor market 
means that women earn less than men; and second, because "women bear the children and 
are better adapted to child (especially infant) care, the wife's costs of household production 
will be lower than the husband's." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
157 (5th ed. 1998). 
36. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to 
Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 93-94 (1993) (discussing what she terms the 
"supply-side preference" theory). 
37. See BECKER, supra note 34, at 23. 
38. POSNER, supra note 35, at 157 (alteration added). 
39. P. 37. As economists take pains to emphasize, of course, "rational" does not mean 
calculated. As Posner explains at the beginning of his textbook on law and economics: 
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Regan then examines how this approach is consistent with the ex­
ternal stance. First, like the external stance, law and economics begins 
with the preferences of the individual actor (p. 48). Second, law and 
economics emphasizes private ordering - agreements and contracts 
- as the appropriate means for structuring relationships (p. 51 ). He 
suggests also that the economic approach is beneficial for women be­
cause, among other things, it can provide a basis for arguing for a more 
equal allocation of resources between the spouses (p. 60). This is so 
because it clarifies the economic benefits and losses experienced by 
each spouse in marriage. Moreover, he argues that the economic ap­
proach to marriage, like the external stance, calls attention to the need 
to acknowledge the spouses' self-interest. Regan believes "[t]he eco­
nomic emphasis on individual interest, consent, and fair exchange may 
offer a useful corrective to a language of sharing that sometimes has 
been used to cloak women's disadvantage" (p. 61). 
Indeed, some feminist scholars have begun to reassess the utility of 
the economic approach to marriage. Their present goal is to ensure 
that caregiving and housework are "counted" as economic contribu­
tions.40 Professor Katharine Silbaugh questions whether the visceral 
reaction against market discourse in the family is a means of under­
mining women's power within the home.41 She argues that opposition 
to market discourse may deprive women of the benefits they should 
receive from performing labor in the household.42 Silbaugh argues for 
the importance of increasing the status of housework in order to in­
crease the status of women both inside and outside of the home.43 She 
carefully documents the contemporary legal approach throughout a 
variety of different fields (divorce, tax, contract, etc.) toward the de-
Economics is not a theory about consciousness. Behavior is rational when it conforms to the 
model of rational choice, whatever the state of mind of the chooser . . . . And self·interest 
should not be confused with selfishness; the happiness . . .  of other people may be part of 
one's satisfactions. 
POSNER, supra note 35, at 4; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 10-11 {2d ed. 1997). 
40. Shirley Burggraf argues for economic incentives to continue parental investment in 
their children. See SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC 
MAN: REVIVING THEROLE OFFAMILYJNTHEPOST-lNDUSTRIALAGE {1996). 
41. See Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 84 {1997) [hereinafter Silbaugh, Commodification]. 
42 See id. at 95; see also Julie A. Nelson, Of Markets and Martyrs: Is it OK to Pay Well 
for Care?, FEMINIST ECON., Fall 1999, at 43, 45, 56 (arguing for a reconceptualization of 
markets as feminizing within a larger set of societal relationships). 
43. See Silbaugh, Commodification, supra note 41, at 121 {"Understanding the economic 
aspects of women's non-market activity is an important part of the transformative vision of 
progressive feminism."); see also Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework 
and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 {1996) [hereinafter Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love]. 
Professor Nancy Staudt believes that imposing truces on housework could help change the 
gendered nature of work. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. LJ. 1571, 1635 
{1996). 
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valuation of housework as work, and toward its valuation as "merely" 
affectionately based, and thus not worthy of compensation.44 Jana 
Singer suggests that privatization may be advantageous to women be­
cause it eliminates some of the "sexism and hierarchy of traditional 
family rules" in marriage, promotes diversity within family relation­
ships, increases people's control and autonomy within reproduction 
and other family-related activities, and may serve as a means of 
reaching "a more just form of public ordering."45 Within a law-and­
economics model, Professor Amy Wax has argued that the traditional 
story is inadequate.46 Instead, she posits that women's caretaking 
work generates positive externalities by benefiting third parties (for 
example, the children themselves) as well as by creating public goods.47 
Consequently, a woman's return on her labor is artificially diminished 
because these positive externalities are received gratuitously.48 She 
suggests that a normative goal should be determining how to ade­
quately compensate women for their entire contribution, including the 
gratuitously conferred benefits. While the language is couched in eco­
nomic terms, the goal is to protect specialization in the internal stance. 
Nonetheless, Regan suggests the limitations of the law and eco­
nomics approach. That approach, he argues, claims to explain all be­
havior within marriage, even altruistic actions, but behavioral research 
fails to support the economic explanation (pp. 62-63). Taking an "ex­
ternal" approach to law and economics, that is, critiquing its underly­
ing assumptions,49 he argues that it cannot account for the interper­
sonal connection and social behavior associated with the internal 
stance. Spouses are not simply rational, utility-maximizing individuals 
at all times within marriage. They are, instead, concerned about each 
other: "an understanding of behavior as noninstrumental, undertaken 
solely for the sake of the other, is perhaps the essential norm that 
guides the behavior of persons in close relationships" (p. 74). By 
overlooking the behavior associated with the internal stance, and by 
attempting to explain such actions solely through a rational basis ac­
count, the economic approach can provide only a partial explanation 
44. See Silbaugh, Commodification, supra note 41, at 82-83; see generally Silbaugh, 
Turning Labor into Love, supra note 43. 
45. Singer, supra note 17, at 1565. See also id. at 1533-40, 1565-67. 
46. See Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and Taxing Women, 44 VILL. L. 
REV. 495 (1999) [hereinafter Wax, Caring Enough]; see generally Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in 
the Shadow of the Market: ls There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509 
(1998). 
47. See Wax, Caring Enough, supra note 46, at 513. 
48. See id. 
49. Professor Brian Bix usefully distinguishes between "internal" and "external" cri­
tiques of law and economics; the internal critique accepts most of the law and economics 
basic approach. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 196 (2d ed. 
1999). 
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of marriage. Indeed, the research of social scientists on incentives for 
individualistic behavior indicates that "helping and cooperation can 
occur without the prospect of individual reward" (p. 66). Drawing ex­
tensively on the work of social psychologists and other empirical 
studies, Regan shows that individuals often act in ways that are inex­
plicable through a focus solely on personal rewards (pp. 70-73). 
While the concept of "efficiency" can be viewed as descriptive 
rather than normative, Regan suggests that the alleged differences 
between positive and normative discourse may be illusory (p. 47). 
Regan, elsewhere, has asserted that the law and economics approach 
appears to be neutral but this alleged neutrality is in fact normative.50 
Regan returns to the economic approach to marriage in the third 
section of Alone Together when he examines the rhetoric surrounding 
property division at divorce. Divorce law, he argues, historically ap­
proached spouses as partners and created post-dissolution obligations 
based on the past relationship. The contemporary approach, however, 
views spouses as "strangers," for whom the "imagery of the market" is 
especially useful (p. 141). When divorce was based on fault grounds 
alone, there was, according to Regan, a conceptual basis for awarding 
alimony because the faulting spouse should not be excused from his 
financial obligations under the marriage contract (p. 144). Regan does 
recognize this as a somewhat idealistic view of alimony. He notes that 
relatively few women received alimony even under a fault-based re­
gime, and they did not receive a great deal of money.51 Nonetheless, 
he observes that, pursuant to a no-fault regime, the traditional justifi­
cations are no longer valid. In response, theorists have developed 
various other rationales to justify continuing financial obligations be­
tween former spouses. Regan explains and then critiques theories 
based on human capital that attempt to provide a coherent basis for 
alimony, by arguing that these theories are based on an external stance 
toward marriage. 
The two human capital theories that he explores provide justifica­
tions for alimony based on the spouses' expectation and reliance inter­
ests. Human capital theories emphasize the increase in earning poten­
tial that marriage has facilitated; typically, one spouse has maximized 
50. See Regan, Market Discourse, supra note 12, at 608-09. 
51. P. 144; see also SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST 
AMERICAN WOMEN 23, 470 (1991) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF 
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 141, 
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1983 (1985)). The data shows that the percentage of 
women who received alimony under no-fault was comparable to the percentage of women 
who received alimony in the 1920s. See Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commit­
ment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111 
{1999). Professor Regan also notes that the internal stance reflected by fault rhetoric cir­
cumscribed women's lives more than men's. Seep. 143. He concludes, however, that "fault­
based divorce featured a coherent discourse of divorce awards that expressed the importance 
of an internal stance toward marriage." P. 144. 
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his earnings while the other spouse has provided the domestic support 
that enables him to do so.5 2 According to the expectation version, the 
supportive spouse is entitled to a reasonable return on her investment 
in the other spouse's human capital.5 3 She should receive the benefit 
of her bargain. 
The second version of human capital theory would compensate 
spouses for the economic loss suffered upon divorce. Because the 
supporting spouse contributed and sacrificed so that her spouse could 
increase his income, she is entitled to recover for these contributions�4 
she receives her reliance interest. Under each of these theories, how­
ever, Regan argues that the spouses are treated as virtual strangers 
who, as a result of a "contract" with each other, become entitled to 
share in the enhanced earnings made possible by the contract (pp. 157-
58). 
In response to the faults in these human capital theories stemming 
from the external perspective, Regan offers some different notions. 
His alternatives are based on an internal stance toward marriage 
which does not include an exact measure of compensation for each 
spouse's contributions to the marriage (p. 190). Instead, he advocates 
equalizing the spouses' standard of living for some time period after 
the divorce.5 5 Such a proposal, he argues, values the domestic labor 
52. P. 148; see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 124-25 (2000). 
53. Pp. 149-53. Professor Regan cites the work of Joan Krauskopf and Cynthia Starnes. 
See Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for 
the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 {1980); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce 
and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyollls and 
Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993). For further discussion, see Joan 
M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for Solllfions to the 
Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253 (1989); Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and 
Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573 (1988). 
Professors June Carbone and Margaret Brinig distinguish between expectation, reliance, 
and restitutionary theories for post-divorce recovery, arguing that the expectation interest is 
what the wife would have received had the marriage continued, the reliance interest protects 
the opportunities lost as a result of the marriage, and the restitutionary interest is the wife's 
investment in the husband's human capital. See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Re­
thinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. 
REV. 953, 958-61, 986 {1991). 
54. Pp. 153-57 (relying on theories of Ira Ellman and Allen Parkman). The concept of 
"economic loss" has become part of the American Law Institute's draft principles for family 
dissolution; Professor Ellman is the Chief Reporter. Pp. 156, 259 n.126. 
55. Pp. 190-92. He cites to Singer's proposal that the duration of this alimony be calcu­
lated as follows: one year of equalization for two years of marriage. See Jana B. Singer, 
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1117-18 (1989). Professor Singer 
has provided further discussion of this proposal in Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: 
The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 
2423, 2454 (1999). See also Joan Williams, ls Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of 
Alimony, 82 GEO. LJ. 2227, 2260-61 (1994); see generally June Carbone, Income Sharing: 
Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV. 359, 372-93 (1994) (dis­
cussing income sharing proposals). 
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contributions of the lower-earning spouse, and is based on the spouses' 
"responsibility for economic justice" which derives from their relation­
ship (p. 190). The entitlement to alimony depends on the relationship 
itself, and on the wife's contributions to the marriage.56 Alimony is 
designed to provide a cushion for the transition from the marital 
community to a single individual - the longer the marriage, the 
longer the transition period (p. 191). The husband's financial obliga­
tion to support his wife derives not just from his consent to the duties 
of marriage, but also from the fact of the marriage itself, from the spe­
cial duties that develop from intimate relationships. It follows that 
marriage is more than an exchange. 
The language of contract and property may in fact be richer than 
this account indicates. In her trenchant critique of Regan's proposal, 
Professor Carol Rose argues that his "supposedly relationship-based 
alternatives still seem to have a great deal of resonance with prop­
erty. "57 That is, his alternatives depend on spousal sharing, but the 
basis for the sharing resembles a property or contractually based the­
ory.ss 
In their article advocating increased marital contracting, Professors 
Eric Rasmusen and Jeffrey Stake argue the spouse who invests in rela­
tionships rather than market capital might want to protect herself at 
the beginning of the marriage by binding her partner to an agreement 
providing her with substantial protection in the event of a divorce.59 
Contract may be more promising on these accounts because it can rec­
ognize relationships. For groups who have historically been excluded 
from making contracts or owning property in their own names, the 
concepts have strong appeal.60 
One of the problems with this proposal is that it may leave a 70-year-old woman with no 
alimony. Cf. Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for 
Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2505 (1994) (noting the limited duration of income-sharing pro­
posals); Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 
1225, 1315 (1998) (noting the need for permanent alimony in some situations). 
56. See Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers, 
82 GEO. LJ. 2409, 2411-12 (1994) (reviewing Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: 
Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO L.J. 2303 (1994)). Rose characterizes 
Regan's Spouses and Strangers as offering an alternative to property rhetoric in marriage 
that is based on relationship, but she critiques it as not being very different from property 
theory at all. 
57. Id. at 2412. For a further defense of property as protective of women and their mari­
tal relationships, see Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting 
Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1575-96 (1998). 
58. See Rose, supra note 56, at 2412. 
59. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personal­
izing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. LJ. 453, 466, 473 (1998); see also Jeffrey Stake, Pater­
nalism in the Law of Marriage, 74 IND. L.J. 801, 803 (1999). 
60. For historical information, see Richard H. Chused, History's Double Edge: A Com­
ment on Modernization of Marital Status Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 2213 (1994); Richard H. Chused, 
Married Women's Property Law: I800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983); Reva B. Siegel, Home 
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Moreover, Regan critiques the traditional law and economics mod­
els, rather than the newer, sometimes even mildly feminist, approaches 
which have developed as a way of recognizing the complicated nature 
of marriage. While these feminist approaches do not resolve all of the 
problems associated with the increasing emphasis on the external 
stance, they do provide some softening of the traditional rhetoric of 
the law and economics approach. Regan's criticisms would still pre­
sumably apply to these newer approaches, but it is interesting to con­
sider how they attempt to account for the internal, caring perspective 
on marriage. 
B. Approaching Marital Privileges 
In addition to examining the economic discourses that are framing 
marriage and marital dissolution, Regan uses the external and internal 
stances to explore two different forms of the spousal testimonial 
privilege. First, the adverse testimony privilege precludes one spouse 
from testifying against another in criminal trials, except those involv­
ing spousal abuse or abuses of either party's child. It takes the form of 
either a complete bar against adverse spousal testimony, unless the 
defendant spouse consents, in a minority of state courts, or of permit­
ting a witness-spouse to choose not to testify in most other state and 
federal courts. Under the traditional rule, the potential testimony 
must actually be adverse.61 The rationale has been that the privilege 
serves to promote marital harmony. Second, the communications 
privilege prevents the disclosure of interspousal confidential commu­
nications that occurred during the marriage, and is generally available 
in both federal and state courts. Although the traditional rule allowed 
either spouse to claim the privilege, some jurisdictions allow only the 
communicating spouse to claim the privilege.6 2 This privilege has tra­
ditionally been supported as encouraging openness between the 
spouses. 
as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 
103 YALE LJ. 1073 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adju­
dicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994) (hereinafter Siegel, 
Modernization]. 
This is similar to the claims of some critical race theorists that "rights" are important. 
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal St11dies Have What 
Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 306-07 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking 
to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 357 
(1987); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed 
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 432-33 (1987). 
61. See Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
1563, 1568 (1985). 
62 See id. at 1571-72. 
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The spousal privileges may have no direct impact on an ongoing 
marriage and Regan questions whether spouses actually know of the 
existence of the privileges (except when there is a pending criminal 
prosecution). He argues that they are important as cultural symbols of 
the meaning of marriage. The privileges illustrate the external and 
internal approaches to marriage by establishing priorities between the 
individual spouse and the marital unit (p. 95). 
He characterizes the traditional and minority forms of the adverse 
testimony privilege as reflecting the internal stance toward marriage, 
because they depend only on the existence of the marriage, not also on 
the consent of the spouses (p. 102). While, as an individual, the wit­
ness spouse63 might be willing to testify, the fact of the marriage pre­
cludes her from testifying and overrides her own preferences. Because 
she is a member of the marital community, rather than an autonomous 
individual, she cannot testify under any circumstances; the mere status 
of marriage precludes her from testifying. The diminishing availability 
of this privilege reflects, then, some diminution in the respect accorded 
the internal stance. 
By contrast, he characterizes the communications privilege as ex­
ternally based. While it could be seen as the type of contract to which 
any reasonable spouse would consent (p. 98), it also depends on the 
state of mind of the communicating spouse: he must have intended 
that the communication be confidential (pp. 99-100). Consequently, 
not all marital communications are privileged. The privilege requires 
that the communicator signal an expectation of confidentiality and 
that the recipient give reason to believe that she will treat the commu­
nication as privileged. Only after a series of voluntary acts, then, will 
the privilege attach. This privilege remains strong within American 
evidentiary law, a reflection of the authority of the external stance (p. 
102). 
Given that the communications privilege attaches only to married 
spouses, and is not available to business partners, I am not certain that 
it should be characterized as an example of the external stance toward 
marriage. Indeed, the communications privilege could just as easily be 
characterized as internal. Based on the privilege, there is a presump­
tion that communications occurring during a marriage are confidential, 
thereby protecting the spouses based simply on their married status.64 
Moreover, the communications privilege survives the dissolution of 
63. The witness-spouse is generally the wife. See Margaret J. Chriss, Troubling Degrees 
of Authority: The Continuing Pursuit of Unequal Marital Roles, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 225, 231 
n.37 {1993) (citing historical co=entary on the paucity of cases involving male witnesses 
compared to those involving female witnesses); id. at 247 n.129 (noting that, as of 1990, there 
were almost ten times as many male prison inmates as female prison inmates). 
64. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, STUDENT EDITION OF 
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.05[3][b], at 18-55 {4th ed. 1999). 
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the marriage, while the adverse testimonial privilege does not.65 This 
survival of the communications privilege, therefore, shows the con­
tinuing connection between the divorced spouses, while the lack of the 
adverse testimonial privilege indicates legal treatment of the spouses 
as strangers rather than as (at least formerly) connected individuals. 
Further, the adverse testimony privilege is available only in criminal 
cases, while the communications privilege can be invoked in civil or 
criminal cases.66 
Regardless of whether each can be characterized as external or in­
ternal, Regan's ultimate conclusion is that the adverse testimony 
privilege deserves more respect because of its protection of an internal 
stance toward marriage (p. 133). He recognizes that the privilege has 
traditionally worked to women's disadvantage, because it is more 
likely to preclude wives, rather than husbands, from testifying.67 
Nonetheless, he argues that this cost may be justified by the benefits of 
continuing the privilege. First, the adverse testimony privilege does 
not apply in cases involving intraspousal abuse.68 Moreover, he argues 
that even as it reinforces an internal stance, it does not force women to 
remain in a marriage.69 
The adverse testimony privilege, rather than forcing people to re­
main married, emerges as an expression of important cultural values 
within marriage. Ultimately, Regan is concerned about spouses who 
remain as autonomous selves during marriage and who seek to mini-
65. See id. at 18-57. 
66. An alternative perspective on the privilege suggests that it does not foster marital 
harmony so much as it preserves the loyalty that has been created. See, e.g., Amanda H. 
Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered Rationale, 14 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 
1, 5 (1999). 
67. P. 128. For feminist critiques of the privilege, see, for example, Chriss, supra note 
63, at 251-54; see also Daniel Ortiz, Making Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2157 (1995) (discussing 
Regan's approach and noting the numerous potential dangers of not allowing women to 
testify against their spouses). 
68. P. 131. This is not, however, universally true. In Maryland, for example, the adverse 
testimonial privilege is available the first time a defendant is charged with spousal abuse. See 
MD. CODE ANN. §  9-106(a)(2) (1998). 
69. P. 132. Professor Regan points out: 
[I]t would be entirely rational for many women to resist th[e internal] stance, because the 
vulnerability that it involves would be exacerbated by the lesser amount of power and re­
sources wives tend to possess compared to their husbands. This suggests that genuine equal­
ity between husbands and wives is necessary before women can embrace the internal stance 
without acute reservations. To the extent that the adverse testimony privilege reinforces 
gender inequality between the spouses, it therefore could have the overall effect of under­
mining, rather than promoting, an internal stance toward marriage. I suggest that the danger 
of this is less than the danger that the incrimination will undermine a norm of spousal loy­
alty. This conclusion, however, is admittedly tentative. 
P. 33. As I discuss later, an internal stance on the testimonial privilege is particularly dan­
gerous in domestic abuse situations. See infra notes 135-137. 
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mize or even avoid any form of vulnerability to each other; he is fur­
ther concerned with marriage as an expression of our cultural values. 
II. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STANCES ON THE BOOK 
Through this book, Professor Regan seeks to remind us that mar­
riage is not just a vehicle for self-fulfillment, but that it is the creation 
of a community and of an entity that differs from the individual identi­
ties of the two spouses. Rather than focus on the rights of the two 
autonomous individuals who marry each other, he examines the com­
munity formed through marriage and seeks to reinforce that commu­
nity. His arguments run counter to those of many family law commen­
tators who applaud the move to contract.70 
He asks, "Why Marriage?," and responds that marriage continues 
to have "powerful cultural power as the paradigm of intimate com­
mitment" (pp. 6-7). He defends marriage against the claim that it has 
supported patriarchy by arguing that there have been significant 
changes in the laws that once enabled marriage to serve as a subordi­
nating institution; it is now a more egalitarian relationship.71 Finally, 
he explains that he is focusing on the married couple, rather than the 
married couple with children, because he wants to examine the institu­
tion of marriage regardless of whether there are children involved (p. 
9). He points out that the decision to marry is no longer a simultane­
ous decision to have children, or vice versa. By separating out chil­
dren from his consideration of marriage, he hopes to show the tensions 
- in family life and law - between choice and community. The irony 
of a lack of interest in marriage without children, he suggests, is that 
this view depends on an analysis of marriage as a privately ordered 
relationship, while it has historically served as a symbol of the connec­
tions inherent in family life (pp. 9-10). 
Many other commentators who have looked at marriage have been 
concerned with a marriage plus children, or they have been concerned 
with divorce, the dissolution of marriage. Alone Together is different 
because it focuses on marriage per se, and on the contemporary dis-
70. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital 
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1998); see 
also Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 59; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Mod­
ern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 687 (suggesting that liberalism, and its corresponding 
emphasis on individual choice, may actually accord with co=unitarian values because lib­
eralism can support family bonds and responsibilities); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, 
Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Con­
tractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982); 
see generally Murphy, supra note 51 (discussing the move to contract and the establishment 
of rights within marriage). 
71. Pp. 7-8. In his earlier book, he endorsed gay marriage. See REGAN, FAMILY LAW, 
supra note 5, at 120-22. 
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courses that define and shape the theory of marriage independent of 
any other factor, such as children. 
Turning to each of Regan's purposes for focusing on marriage, I 
simply want to raise some questions. First, it is true that marriage con­
tinues to retain powerful symbolic value. Historically, it has served to 
determine identity. Today, ask any advocate - or any opponent - of 
same-sex marriage about the cultural significance of marriage and the 
answer will illustrate marriage's significance. Proponents of gay mar­
riage argue that marriage is a key part of citizenship,72 carries an im­
portant philosophical recognition of the relationship,73 and offers sub­
stantial economic and practical advantages.74 Within the gay commu­
nity, there are questions as to whether the recognition of gay marriage 
leads to uncritical acceptance of dominant legal models and coopta­
tion.75 Opponents outside the gay community argue that marriage is 
historically, traditionally, and culturally defined as being a heterosex­
ual relationship.76 Philosophically, they argue that marriage must in­
volve procreation and child-rearing.77 They believe that a heterosex-
72 See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1181 (1999) ("By expressly disallowing same-sex unions, the state 
devalues the lives of its gay and lesbian citizens, denying their very citizenship in a vital re­
spect that others take for granted."); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on 
Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 165 (1996) ("There is no doubt 
that marriage currently represents the social and legal badge of full citizenship."). 
73. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, 
OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, 12-13: 
Marriage is much more than a relationship sanctioned by law. It is the centerpiece of our en­
tire social structure, the core of the traditional notion of 'family.' Even in its present tar­
nished state, the marital relationship inspires sentiments suggesting that it is something al­
most suprahuman. The Supreme Court, in striking down an anti·contraception statute in 
1965, called marriage 'noble' and 'intimate to the degree of being sacred' . • . • Lesbians and 
gay men are now denied entry to this 'noble' and 'sacred' institution. The implicit message is 
this: two men or two women are incapable of achieving such an exalted domestic state. Gay 
relationships are somehow less significant, less valuable. Such relationships may, from time 
to time and from couple to couple, give the appearance of a marriage, but they can never be 
of the same quality or importance. 
74. See id. at 10 (highlighting the ability to inherit without a will or gain health insurance 
from a spouse's employer). 
75. See, e.g., Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17, 20 n.14, 21 (1999); Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask 
For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of 
Gender in Every Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 {1993) ("I believe that the desire to 
marry in the lesbian and gay co=unity is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream 
society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution . . . .  "). 
76. See Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a 
Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 748-751 (1998). 
77. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 72-73 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974)). 
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ual relationship is uniquely beneficial to society and therefore must be 
protected.78 
Notwithstanding the cultural significance of marriage, however, the 
rate of marriage varies quite dramatically depending on race and class, 
and the increasing number of cohabitating couples does raise issues 
about the continuing significance of marriage. Slightly more than one­
third of all black women are married, while almost 60% of white 
women are married;79 34.7% of people between the ages of twenty-five 
to thirty-four had never been married, but 53.4% of African 
Americans in that age group had never been married.80 
Among poor people, the marriage rate is extremely low. Only 
about 35% of poor people live in married couple families, compared 
to almost 73% of the nonpoor.81 As Rebecca Blank suggests, "[t]he 
78. See Wardle, supra note 76, at 749 ("But no other companionate relationship pro­
vides the same great potential for benefiting individuals and society as the heterosexual 
covenant union we call marriage, and that is why only committed heterosexual unions are 
given the legal status of marriage."); see also Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Consti­
tutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 29 ("Although the Constitution 
does not mention the word marriage, marriage is undeniably deeply imbedded in the tradi­
tions of our nation and essential to the ordered liberty of nations. Indeed, marriage status is 
the ultimate example of long-established, highly preferred public status. It is official, formal, 
publicly endorsed, and powerfully protected."). 
79. See Popenoe & Whitehead, supra note 15, fig. 2. In a study of the attitudes of 
African-American women toward marriage (316 respondents), the comparatively Jess edu­
cated and lower income respondents expressed more negative attitudes toward marriage 
than did wealthier and more highly educated women. See Anthony E.O. King, African 
American Females' Attitudes Towards Marriage: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BLACK STUD. 
416, 431 (1999); see generally DONNA FRANKLIN, ENSURING INEQUALITY: THE STRUC­
TURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILY (1997). 
80. See TERRY A. LUGALIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE: CURRENT POPULA­
TION REPORTS, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) 
(1998). Professor Donna Franklin notes that the number of black men involved with the 
criminal justice system, together with the inadequacy of job opportunities available for black 
men, has decreased the number of marriageable black men. See FRANKLIN, supra note 79, at 
219. In a study of 415 black men from Chicago, researchers found that black men who had 
stable jobs were twice as likely to get married as were black men who were not employed, in 
school, or in the military. See Mark Testa & Marilyn Krogh, The Effect of Employment on 
Marriage Among Black Males in Inner-City Chicago, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE 
AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS 59, 93 (M. Belinda Tucher & Qaudia Mitchell-Kernan eds., 
1995). 
There is a long-term difference between the white and black marriage rates. Indeed, the 
lower rate of "legitimate" black marriage was used by segregationists as an example of black 
immorality. See generally Anders Walker, Note, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists 
Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 
47 DUKE L.J. 399, 406-08 (1997). See also Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Recon­
struction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 
(1999). 
81. See REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING 
POVERTY 17 (1997). Poor People are defined as those individuals with a family income be­
low the poverty line. See id. at 15. Only 15.1 % of "current" (as of 1997) welfare recipients 
are married compared to 28 % of former recipients. See THE URBAN INSTITUTE, ASSESSING 
THE NEW FEDERALISM 3 (Nov. 1999). For further discussion of poor single mothers, see 
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fact that so many women choose to live extremely poor lives as single 
mothers suggests that marriage is unattractive to these women, for 
reasons we should take seriously. "82 
The number of cohabitating couples is dramatically increasing: 
approximately 35% of people born in the 1960s were expected to co­
habit by the age of twenty-five, compared to fewer than 8% of those 
born in the 1940s.83 One study found that cohabitation is more attrac­
tive than marriage for couples who do not want to feel "constrain[ed]" 
by marital roles in which men are breadwinners and women are 
homemakers.84 For people in these relationships, the study suggests 
that the ideology and structure of marriage is thus less appealing for 
people choosing to cohabit. 
The number of children born outside of marriage continues to in­
crease. In 1990, almost 70% of births to teenagers were nonmarital 
births, while 25% of births to women between the ages of twenty to 
forty-four were nonmarital;85 about one-third of all births occur to un­
married women.86 The meaning and significance of marriage thus 
varies, depending on many cultural variables. 
It is worth asking whether the need to balance the internal and ex­
ternal stances also varies depending on socioeconomic culture; indeed, 
the applications of the stances discussed in Alone Together have vary­
ing amounts of relevance. Thinking about the internal and external 
stances outside of a white middle-class culture provides some support 
for Regan's critiques of the cultural movement toward autonomous 
individuals within marriage. Where there is no money, a law and eco­
nomics perspective is of even more doubtful utility in describing mar­
riage than it is in a marriage of middle-class or wealthy individuals. 
Concepts of human capital, of allowing one spouse to specialize in 
household labor and the other in market labor are generally inappli­
cable where both spouses must work.87 Similarly, the property rhetoric 
Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions From Welfare "Re­
form," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 708 nn.86-89 (1998). 
82. BLANK, supra note 81, at 42. This phenomenon, she suggests, may be attributed to 
the increases in women's wages and the decrease in men's wages, as well as the reduction in 
the stigma attached to single motherhood. See id. 
83. See Marin Clarkberg et al., Attitudes, Values, and Entrance into Cohabitational Ver-
sus Marital Unions, 74 Soc. FORCES 609, 609 (1995). 
84. See id. at 624. 
85. See BLANK, supra note 81, at 33. 
86. See Linda Waite, The Importance of Marriage is Being Overlooked, USA TODAY, 
Jan. 1999 (Magazine), at 46. 
87. This is not to say that there is not a gendered allocation of household roles in such a 
marriage, but merely that both spouses must develop marketable skills. For a discussion of 
the gendered household roles regardless of employment outside of the home, see FRANCINE 
DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: How EQUALLY SHARED PARENTING WORKS (1999); see also 
Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of Gender, Class, and Inter­
personal Power, 10 GENDER & SOC'Y 527 {1996); WILLIAMS, supra note 52. 
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concerning divorce has little descriptive and rhetorical power where 
there is no property or where low wages are insufficient to support 
even one person.88 Turning to the spousal privilege, it may have some 
rhetorical power within poor marriages. Given the percentage of 
black men involved in the criminal justice system compared to the per­
centage of white men,89 however, spousal privilege may have a dispro­
portionate impact on black women. 
For poor people, the law often promotes an internal stance that is 
damaging to the family. The financial impact of getting married can 
be severe. When public welfare recipients marry, the inclusion of their 
spouses' income may result in their being denied any further public 
benefits; there is a presumption of sharing.90 Marriage fosters the pri­
vatization of their dependency.91 For working-class poor people, the 
structure of the Earned Income Tax Credit creates a marriage pen­
alty.92 The credit was originally designed to help ease the work disin­
centives for poor households with children and it accords insufficient 
attention to the needs of poor two-earner marriages, punishing them 
instead.93 Professor Dorothy Brown also points out that the marriage 
88. Professor Martha Ertman has suggested that the rhetoric of money has some utility 
even for poor families who divorce; the spouses can divide debt, rather than income. See 
Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work 
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77  TEXAS L. REV. 17, 22, 105 (1998). Even this 
proposal, however, has some flaws because a very poor individual can file for bankruptcy. 
Conversation with Professor Lucy Williams, Northwestern University School of Law (June 
1999). 
89. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Paul Butler, Starr is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors 
are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REV. 705 (1999); Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the 
Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660 (1996) (reviewing MICHAEL TONRY, 
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995)). 
90. See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (197 7) (upholding provision in the Social 
Security Act terminating benefits for dependent child when the child marries someone ineli­
gible for benefits). 
91. See Dubler, supra note 28; Ariela Dubler, Wifely Behavior, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming May 2000). 
92 See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 194 (1997) (arguing that current tax 
laws serve to "penaliz[e] marriage among the poor") [hereinafter MCCAFFERY, TAXING 
WOMEN]; Edward J. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits, 44 VILL. L. REV. 445, 484-85 
(1999) [hereinafter McCaffery, Burdens]; see generally Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and 
Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 
1479-81 (1997) [hereinafter Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism]. 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a tax credit that "is 'refundable,' meaning that 
if the amount of credit that a family qualifies for exceeds the family's tax liability, the federal 
government will make a payment to the family of that excess amount." Mark Greenberg, 
Welfare Restructuring and Working-Poor Family Policy, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND 
WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 24, 28 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999). In 
1996, "the EITC provided its maximum assistance to a family in the $8,890 to $11,160 range." 
Id. 
93. See McCaffery, Burdens, supra note 92, at 481-91. 
1788 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1766 
penalty disproportionately affects black families.94 This is because the 
marriage penalty affects couples who are equal earners, and black 
families are more likely than white families to have equally contribut­
ing earners.95 Getting married is, in some senses, resistance against an 
external stance because the spouses are focusing on the relationship, 
not the economic realities. 
Black women are much more likely to work than are white women, 
and their wages are far closer to black men's than are white women's 
to white men's.96 Within married households, black women earn ap­
proximately 40% of their household's income, while white women 
earn only about 29%.97 Equalizing income post-divorce, then, is not as 
important for African-American women. Indeed, Professor Twila 
Perry challenges the attention given by family law scholars to the justi­
fications for alimony: 
[T]he marriage paradigm that has, to a great extent, shaped the discourse 
on developing a theory of alimony . . .  has the potential to reinforce the 
subordination and marginalization of black women in two ways: first, by 
reinforcing privilege or an image of privilege for middle and upper­
middle class white women in both marriage and divorce, and second, by 
reinforcing a hierarchy among women in which their value is determined 
by the presence or absence of legal ties to men, particularly affluent 
men.98 
Perry argues that theories of alimony premised upon images of a 
breadwinner husband and a lesser-earning spouse do not apply to 
most black marriages.99 There is something strange, then, about 
spending so much time and attention on something that affects rela­
tively few divorcing black couples (and non-black couples as well). 
Moreover, the external stance, as represented by the law and eco­
nomics discourse, may also be more complex as applied to African­
American families.100 From an external stance, it makes little eco­
nomic sense for some black couples to marry.101 
94. See Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the Twenty-First Century: What's Tax 
Policy Got to Do With It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 759, 760 (1999) [hereinafter Brown, 
Racial Equality]; Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 92, at 1498-99. 
95. See Brown, Racial Equality, supra note 94, at 760. 
96. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 787, 795-96 (1997). 
97. See id. at 793. 
98. Perry, supra note 55, at 2484. 
99. See id. at 2493-94. 
100. Professor Richard Delgado provides one of the few critical race critiques of law and 
economics. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics 
of Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1 183, 1202 (1993) (book review) ("[L]aw and economics is . . .  [a] 
useful way of ordering relations and transactions within a given system . . .  but a poor way of 
understanding and dealing with broad, systemic distortions built into the very structure of 
that system."); see also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for 
Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 215 (1998) (book review). 
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The negative aspects of the class and race nature of marriage sug­
gest the importance of looking at alternatives to marriage and of cre­
ating community within those relationships. Recognizing intimacy 
between adults may involve changes in laws governing cohabitation. 
An increasing number of jurisdictions are providing protection for on­
going adult intimate relationships through domestic partnership ordi­
nances, but the scope of these protections varies dramatically.102 Laws 
governing the rights of cohabitants upon dissolution, especially, re­
main in disarray. In some states, cohabitants can sue each other on a 
variety of theories, while other states provide little recognition to any 
rights.103 Imposing the obligations of marriage upon cohabitants could 
cause these relationships to be treated more like marriage, and might 
foster a sense of interdependence.104 
The differential rates of marriage also suggest the importance of 
familial relationships other than those between intimate adults, such as 
those between parents and children, or between grandparents and 
children.105 Indeed, Regan's focus on marriage occurs as other schol­
arly commentators are questioning the continuing validity of marriage. 
Professor Martha Fineman advocates the abolition of marriage as a 
legally privileged unit, although not the abolition of marriage itself.106 
One possible interpretation, supported by an economic approach, is that some black 
women are likely to gain little from marriage to an unemployed black man. See David M. 
Heer, Commentary, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS, supra 
note 80, at 117, 118-19. 
101. In commenting on this paper, Professor Katharine Baker asks: "Is part of what is 
going on that an internal stance requires an acceptance of vulnerability that many people 
cannot afford - they are already made too vulnerable by race, class, etc.?" Conversation 
with Professor Katharine Baker, Chicago-Kent College of Law (May 2000). 
Available research does not show that loss of public welfare benefits upon marriage has 
caused a decline in marriage. See Lynn C. Burbridge, Policy Implications of a Decline in 
Marriage Among African-Americans, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN 
AMERICANS, supra note 80, at 323, 330. 
102. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lambda Legal Issue: Domestic 
Partnership (visited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/issues/ 
record?record=3>, for discussion of a range of issues involving domestic partnerships. 
103. For a listing of the various types of relief available in each state, see Katherine C. 
Gordon, Note, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: When Strings 
Will Attach and How to Prevent Them - A  State Survey, 37 BRANDEIS LJ. 245 (1998-99). 
104. More than a decade ago, Professor Ellen Kandoian asked, "[w]hy not . . .  support 
those parties who are in fact committed" rather than simply those who are married? Ellen 
Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 
75 GEO LJ. 1829, 1872 (1987). 
105. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), cert granted sub nom. Troxel 
v. Granville, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-138). See also Karen Czapanskiy, 
Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. 
REV. 1315 (1994) (arguing for "co-guardianship" contracts between parents and grandpar­
ents who act as co-parents). 
106. See FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 228-30; Ann Shalleck, Presentation at The Associa­
tion of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (January 1998). 
1790 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1766 
She argues that relationships between intimate adults should be sub­
ject to the legal norms applicable to nonintimate relationships,107 
thereby encouraging an external approach to adult intimacy. On the 
other hand, she would protect the caretaker-child unit, promoting an 
internal stance on that relationship.108 Professor June Carbone argues 
that the relationship between the spouses has become less important 
than the relationship between parent and child, and that family law 
should seek to encourage parents' continuing investment in their chil­
dren.109 
In addition, a new focus on vertical intimacy as well as horizontal 
intimacy110 would recognize the realities of the many families formed 
without marriage. The exclusive focus of familial responsibilities is no 
longer the marital unit. Instead, as discussed earlier, the parent-child 
unit has also become a focus of familial obligations.111 This is particu­
larly true for poor and black families. 
Second, while the laws surrounding marriage are gender-neutral, 
and refer to "spouses" rather than to "husband and wife,"112 marriage 
remains a gendered institution. Women disproportionately continue 
to perform the second shift.113 Where there are children, women do 
the primary work of caring for the children, as well as household work. 
Even with childless couples, women disproportionately perform the 
household labor.114 Although more married women are working, 
women are disproportionately employed in part-time labor, and they 
remain more likely than men to take off time during their work lives.115 
107. She suggests that the assumptions of these other laws, such as notions of an "arms­
length transaction," should also be revised in order to reflect the realities of inequality. See 
FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 229-30. 
108. See id. at 231. 
109. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS 323-42 (Chapter 23, "Conclu­
sion: From Partners to Parents: The Ongoing Revolution") (forthcoming 2000). 
110. See Baker, supra note 57, at 1525-26 (defining horizontal relationships as those 
between adults who decide to form a family through marriage, and vertical relationships as 
those between children and individuals with parental rights). 
111. See generally CARBONE, supra note 109. 
112 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down a statute that allowed ali­
mony only for wives, not husbands). 
113. The second shift involves work performed at home outside of the external work 
place. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT {1989); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 
52, at 13-31 {Chapter 1, "Is Domesticity Dead?"); Silbaugh, Commodification, supra note 41. 
114. See SANnv GUPTA, What Makes Men Change Their Housework Time? (1999) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor)) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library). 
115. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52; infra notes 122-126 and accompanying text. Seventy 
percent of part time workers are women. See AFL-CIO, Working Women: Equal Pay -
Facts About Working Women, (visited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.aflcio.org/women/wwfacts. 
htln>. Women are more likely to disrupt their work lives. See Hearings Before the Sub­
comm on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm. (statements of Leslie Kramerich); 
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Also, upon divorce, the standard of living for women decreases, while 
that for men increases; one of the most common reasons for women to 
become first-time welfare recipients is separation or divorce.116 Re­
gardless of the phrasing of the laws governing marriage, women re­
main in subordinate positions in marriage. 
The rhetoric of domesticity, while no longer explicitly enforced 
through law, retains force through its gendered expectations of care­
takers as opposed to workers.117 Even though laws no longer literally 
reinforce patriarchy, the dominance of the husband's role is supported 
through "emotion"118 and social constraints: women continue to view 
themselves as caretakers of both husbands and children, and make 
decisions to support that role. As Rhona Mahoney shows, women 
train themselves to become the primary caretaker, long before they 
find a partner, by the choices they make with respect to education and 
work.119 Girls' decisions not to take math in high school are directly 
related to the profession that they. will ultimately choose. These deci­
sions will cause them - not the fathers - to drop out of the work­
place.120 Although workplace participation by women with young 
children has increased dramatically,121 women are far more likely to 
work part-time.122 More than two-thirds of all part-time workers are 
Impacts of the Current Social Security System: Hearings Before the Soc. Sec. of the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 97 (1999) (statement of Joan Entmacher, Vice­
President and Director, Family Econ. Sec. Nat'l Women's Law Ctr.). 
116. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, INDICATORS OF WELFARE 
DEPENDENCE: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1998, at 11-24. 
117. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). 
118. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 16, 38 (discussing the enforcement of domesticity 
through emotion and "choice rhetoric"); Siegel, supra note 60, at 2168-69 (describing how 
courts preserved a wife's common law duties in their application of the legislature's ostensi­
ble transformation of the marriage relationship); see also DEUTSCH, supra note 87, at 73-81 
(discussing ways in which men reinforce women's identification with the household and chil­
dren by failing to take responsibility). 
119. See RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND 
BARGAINING POWER (1995). Law and economics scholars, as well as their critics, have 
looked at the family to examine the alleged logic of role differentiation. See, e.g., Jana B. 
Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 FAM. L.Q. 119 
(1997). 
120. See MAHONY, supra note 119, at 137. She recommends that parents who want their 
daughters to have financial independence should "insist on one simple discipline: that their 
daughters take at least three years of math in high school." Id. · 
121. See Kristin McCue & Manuelita Ureta, Women in ihe Workplace: Recent Eco­
nomic Trends, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 125, 135-36 (1995). 
122 See Social Security and Women: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security 
of the House Ways and Means Comm., lOlst Cong. (statement of Joan Entmacher, Vice­
President, National Women's Law Center) (42% of mothers with children under six were 
employed full-time compared to 90% of fathers with children under six, and 18 % of mothers 
with children under six, compared to 3% of such fathers, were employed part-time); Ann 
Bookman, Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for Women Workers, 52 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 799, 803-04 (1995). 
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women, and women constitute almost 70% of all "voluntary" part­
time workers.123 Women between the ages of twenty-five and forty­
four are more than eight times as likely as men of the same age to 
work part-time, and the data suggest that this is due to childrearing 
responsibilities and choices.124 The majority of women with children 
younger than five either stay at home or work part-time.125 Only 2% 
of fathers of pre-schoolers, compared to 20% of mothers, allowed 
child-related concerns to affect their work schedules.126 Men also re­
tain control over most of the financial incidents of marriage.127 
Thus, within marriage, women seemingly "choose," or assume, a 
role associated with the internal stance of connection and community 
and interdependency. This concept of choice, of course, fails to recog­
nize the constructed nature of women's choices.128 Indeed, the rhetoric 
of choice diverts attention from the constraints surrounding any par­
ticular decision, and onto the actual action of making choices.129 That 
is, instead of looking at what is chosen, we need to examine the pa­
rameters in which choice occurs, the ideologies that structure any par­
ticular "choice." At the same time, however, there is debate over 
whether an acknowledgment that ideology figures in choices implies 
that individuals have no control over their lives.130 
For purposes of discussing the internal and external stances associ­
ated with marriage, what is important is acknowledging the imbalance 
123. See Bookman, supra note 122, at 804. Voluntary part-time workers are those who 
have chosen, for whatever reason, not to work full-time. See Ame L. Kalleberg, Part-Time 
Work and Workers in the United States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 771, 776 (1995). 
124. See id. at 775. 
125. Homing in on Motherhood: Stay-at-home Mothers, 66 MOTHERING 32 (1993). 
126. See Ellis Cose, The Daddy Trap: After All the Talk About Equality of the Sexes, a 
Man is Still Expected to Be the Breadwinner, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 1995, (Magazine), at 16 
(citing 1991 Census Bureau survey). 
127. While there are little good data on this, anecdotal evidence supports the few studies 
that do exist. See Carole B. Burgoyne, Money in Marriage: How Patterns of Allocation Both 
Reflect and Conceal Power, 38 Soc. REV. 634 (1990); Jan Pahl, The A/location of Money and 
the Structuring of Inequality Within Marriage, 31 Soc. REV. 237 (1983). 
128. See Murphy, supra note 81, at 724; Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and 
Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising 
the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990); Wax, Caring Enough, supra 
note 46; Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1559 (1991); Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on 
Choice in the Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1369 (1992) 
(book review); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 217 (1987) 
(exploring issues of false consciousness). 
129. See Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall, 80 
GEO. LJ. 2093 (1992); Williams, supra note 128, at 1564. 
130. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52; Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 
GA. L. REV. 761, 795 (1990); Juditlt G. Greenberg, Introduction to MARY JOE FRUG, 
POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM ix, xxix (1992). 
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in the relationship in which women live in an internal marriage and 
focus on intimacy, while men live in an external marriage and focus on 
rights. Professor Robin West argues that women differ from men in 
their valuing of intimacy.131 "Women's coni::ept of value revolves . . .  
around the axis of intimacy, nurturance, community, responsibility, 
and care," while men are more concerned with autonomy and separa­
tion.132 Like Carol Gilligan, West identifies women with connection to 
others, and men with individualism.133 Intimacy thus can be seen, at 
least in some senses, as a gendered value. Indeed, historical images 
from the nineteenth century of white, middle-class women have identi­
fied them with intimacy, and have placed women and intimacy within 
the domain of the family, in contrast to the male, cold-blooded mar­
ketplace.134 
Moreover, women have gained some form of power through their 
nurturing roles, a power that has both positive and negative attributes. 
Acting as the relationship-centered spouse is an extremely rewarding 
role, even as it is simultaneously a "confining" position that may also 
serve to preclude men from assuming the same role.135 At the same 
time, connection can be dangerous for women.136 Indeed, for victims 
of domestic violence, the internal stance is particularly problematic.137 
Focusing on the relationship rather than on their needs may lead 
women to stay with an abuser rather than to leave the relationship. 
The association of women with intimacy and men with justice is 
neither inevitable, unvarying, nor immutable. Nonetheless, marriage 
131. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinaf­
ter West, Jurisprudence]; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Bedonie Lives: A Phe­
nomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987). 
132. West, Jurisprudence, supra note 131, at 28. 
133. See GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE supra note 31; Gilligan, Remapping, supra note 
31. 
134. See, e.g., NANCY F. COIT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN 
NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of 
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 {1983); Williams, supra note 117. For a 
discussion that focuses on black women, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial 
Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEM. 51 (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts 
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
1419 (1991). 
135. For a discussion of the complexities associated with women's internal stance toward 
their families, see Naomi R. Cahn, Women's Work: The Powers of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. 
& FEM. (forthcoming Fall 2000). 
136. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 3-4, 10 {1997). 
137. See Baker, supra note 57, at 1554-55; see generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Im­
ages of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991) 
(stating that women are most at danger in abusive relationships when they leave, asserting 
their autonomous rights to violence-free lives). 
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remains a gendered138 institution in which women remain more likely 
to exhibit an internal stance toward creating and nurturing the family, 
and men are more likely to exhibit an external stance by focusing on 
work outside of the home. The man's role remains the breadwinner, 
while the woman's role remains the nurturer. Perhaps a better bal­
ancing of the internal and external stances could be achieved by a 
gendered strategy that encouraged men to focus on the marriage, and 
women to focus on themselves.139 
Like Professor Regan, however, I believe that marriage serves im­
portant intimacy goals for women.140 Thus, to the extent that marriage 
continues as a significant cultural institution, the goal should be to fos­
ter in men the same commitment to intimacy and to the internal stance 
that women have traditionally experienced. A focus on the internal 
stance for men might involve, on a practical level, more time spent on 
housework and child care and relationship-building. Focus on the ex­
ternal stance for women might involve less time on household-related 
chores and caretaking together with more leisure time; it need not 
necessarily involve increased workforce participation.141 
To be sure, Regan does not advocate the abandonment of an ex­
ternal stance toward marriage and complete acquiescence to an inter­
nal stance. Instead, he argues for the importance of acknowledging 
the tensions between the stances. As Regan recognizes, there are par­
ticular dangers for women from the internal stance, and benefits from 
the external stance, that must be recognized (pp. 59-61, 128-33). 
While the number of marriages without children is increasing, it 
remains true that an overwhelming percentage of all married couples 
have, or have had, children.142 Children remain an incredibly impor­
tant part of any marriage that can change the dynamics of the relation-
138. I feel compelled to add in the requisite "gender" footnote. The behavior I am dis­
cussing is gendered female or male, even though not all men and not all women exhibit such 
behavior. 
139. See Baker, supra note 57, at 1552-54 (discussing how women's connectedness may 
be a detriment in marriage). As is clear, I agree with Professor Baker on the need for 
women to become stronger advocates for themselves. I think, in addition, that men must 
focus on the relationship and develop a stronger sense of the internal stance. 
140. By contrast, Professor Baker suggests that "the primary advantages that privileging 
the marital bond hold for men are relatively less important for women because the expres­
sive and constituent roles that marriage serves for men are relatively less important for 
women, who have other relationships that serve this purpose." Baker, supra note 57, at 
1557. That is, she believes that women will continue to want the intimacy of marriage, but 
that marriage-associated intimacy is less important for women than for men, because men 
have had fewer experiences with intimacy and personal communication. 
141. See Baker, supra note 57, at 1575-96 for further suggestions; Joan Williams has 
suggested the need for restructuring the workplace so it is no longer designed around a male 
breadwinner relying on a stream of domestic services. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 65. 
142. The number of children born outside of marriage also indicates the independence 
of marriage from children. 
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ship. The existence of children within a marriage does provide sup­
port for Regan's call for more balance between the two different 
stances, which involves more attention to the internal stance of mar­
riage. There may be less of a need to de-emphasize the external 
stance when it comes to children, because family members have al­
ready followed the internal stance by making a decision to care for 
someone else. As a culture, however, we inadequately promote the 
connection between parents and children by, for example, separating 
poor parents and their children143 and by fostering a work ethic that 
distances parents and children.144 
On the other hand, given that couples are less willing now than in 
the past to stay together for the sake of their children, there may still 
be a need to account for children within a marriage. In the first year 
after a baby's birth, 70% of wives feel unhappy about their marriage.145 
Gottman and Silver believe that the underlying reason for this unhap­
piness is that husbands have not shared in the transformation that par­
enthood brings.146 Moreover, as discussed earlier, the existence of 
children might lead to a greater imbalance within the marriage. 
Women will be more likely to focus on the family and men on them­
selves. Regardless of the reasons for this specialization - economic, 
normative, constrained choices - it contributes to an unequal differ­
entiation in approaches to marriage. 
Thus, even when children are factored into marriage, the tension 
between individual and community remains, and may even be exacer­
bated. Not considering the role of children deprives an examination of 
marriage of some of the richness and complexities of marriage itself; 
the nature of marriage changes once children enter the picture. 
Moreover, the existence of children may also support the proposition 
that women need more of an external stance, while men need more of 
an internal stance because of the caretaking role that mothers remain 
more likely to assume. Thus, the balance needs to occur not just 
within our laws and culture, but also within each marriage. 
III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE 
Alone Together is an extremely thoughtful book that calls for more 
societal and legal attention to the relationship of marriage than to the 
rights of each individual spouse within marriage. Regan examines dif­
ferent aspects of contemporary law and rhetoric that promote the in-
143. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, 
Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189 (1999); Catherine J. Ross, Placing Out, 60 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1249 (1999). 
144. See WEST, supra note 136, at 3; WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 64-113. 
145. See GOITMAN & SILVER, supra note 1, at 211. 
146. See id. at212. 
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terests of individual spouses at the expense of the sharing and interre­
lationships that typify marriage. 
Regan captures something profound about the discourses on con­
temporary marriage through his exploration of the external and inter­
nal stances. He suggests that his analysis applies to issues other than 
the rhetoric of law and economics, the division of property at divorce, 
or the understandings of the spousal testimonial privilege. 
Indeed, the locations where the two different stances play out on a 
day to day basis within marriage are not through the three issues 
Regan discusses. Instead, the daily examples of the internal and ex­
ternal stances occur in negotiations over who will do the grocery shop­
ping, who will pick up the children from school, who will take out the 
garbage, and whether there is enough money to pay the mortgage or 
rent. In these interactions, I suspect that one spouse (probably, 
although not necessarily the woman) focuses on the relationship, while 
one spouse (probably, although not necessarily the man) focuses on 
each individual's obligations. 
In addition to the rhetoric outside of the marriage shifting to a 
more internal focus, thereby reinforcing concepts of relationships and 
self-in-context, I believe that each marriage must develop more "in­
ternal" balance as well. This will generally mean that the gendered 
female spouse must emphasize her rights as an individual, while the 
gendered male spouse locates himself as part of a relationship. 
The values associated with the internal and external stances on 
marriage have deep resonance in a culture that has a historical com­
mitment to recognizing individuals within communities. As Milton 
Regan so eloquently reminds us, we must respect both individual and 
community, even as we acknowledge the tensions. The tensions be­
tween self and community, he points out, transcend family law. 
